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ESSAY
EVIDENCE-BASED LAW
Jeffrey J. Rachlinskit
Numerology is sweeping the professions. In the past decade, both
medicine and business have witnessed a radical growth in efforts to subject
common wisdoms to empirical testing, which has come to be called evidence-
based medicine (or business). The rise of empirical legal scholarship suggests
that law will soon face, or is already facing, a similar movement. With an
increase in available data and user-friendly desktop statistical packages, any
law professor (or student) can test any theory-from the deterrent effect of the
death penalty to the existence of the litigation explosion. This trend is surely
all to the good in all three disciplines. False myths are a nuisance that can
mislead physicians into erroneous treatment, support costly business prac-
tices, and produce misguided legal reform. But medicine and business each
have a relatively unified mission-the treatment ofpatients and the produc-
tion of profits-meaning that their theories are either right or wrong. Law,
however, lacks this uniformity of purpose. It is often politics by other means
that sorts winners and losers, rather than right and wrong, thereby clouding
the normative environment. What is accepted fact in medicine and business
is contestable in law. Law's political nature does not render empirical test-
ing of widely held myths a hopeless misadventure but complicates the hope
(and the value) of creating an evidence-based law.
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following story about a lecture at a medical school:
[A] very important Boston surgeon visited the school and delivered
a great treatise on a large number of patients who had undergone
successful operation for vascular reconstruction. At the end of the
lecture, a young student at the back of the room timidly asked, "Do
you have any controls?" Well, the great surgeon drew himself up to
his full height, hit the desk, and said, "Do you mean did I not oper-
ate on half of the patients?" The hall grew very quiet then. The
voice at the back of the room very hesitantly replied, "Yes, that's
what I had in mind." Then the visitor's fist really came down as he
thundered, "Of course not. That would have doomed half of them
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I would like to thank the participants in this
symposium for their comments, as well as Robert B. Diener '82 and David S. Litman '82,
founders of the Cornell Law School-Tel Aviv University Exchange Initiative for their sup-
port of this Essay and Symposium.
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to their death." God, it was quiet then, and one could scarcely hear
the small voice ask, "Which half?"
The story illustrates that medicine struggles with its foundations
in both the scientific method and in clinical technique. The surgeon
might be right that withholding his technique is wrong, but so too is
the student right to wonder how it is the doctor knows that the treat-
ment works. University hospitals are filled with research units using
controlled techniques designed to test new drugs and procedures.2
But medicine also has an inherently clinical focus on individual doc-
tors and individual patients that can make it difficult for many doctors
to think like statisticians and scientists. So it is that space remained
for a modern "evidence-based medicine" movement to emerge.3 The
idea behind this movement is to subject even the most innocuous as-
sumptions to empirical scrutiny.4
More recently, business school professors have argued that the
concept of evidence-based thinking should be extended to the field of
business.5 As Stanford Graduate School of Business Professors Jeffrey
Pfeffer and Robert Sutton put it, business is filled with "dangerous
half-truths and total nonsense."6 Books on business are filled, for ex-
ample, with advice to managers that promote linking performance
tightly to pay ("pay-for-performance programs"), 7 spending significant
energy on developing a clear strategy ("strategy is destiny"),8 and even
such extreme measures as firing the worst performing ten percent of
employees ("forced ranking").9 In each case, virtually no evidence
whatsoever can be found that these measures have significant benefi-
1 More and Bigger Clinical Trials Ahead, MED. WORLD NEWS, Sept. 1, 1972, at 45.
2 See id. at 46 (noting that, in 1972, the "multi-institutional approach to clinical re-
search appear[ed] to be gaining popularity throughout medicine").
3 See generally David L. Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It
Isn't, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71 (1996) (describing evidence-based medicine).
4 See id. at 71 ("Evidence based medicine is the conscientious, explicit, and judicious
use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients.").
5 See JEFFREY PFEFFER & ROBERT 1. SurroN, HARD FAcrs, DANGEROUS HALF-TRUTHS
AND TOTAL NONSENSE: PROFITING FROM EVIDENCE-BASED MANAGEMENT 13 (2006) ("Evi-
dence-based management proceeds from the premise that using better, deeper logic and
employing facts to the extent possible permits leaders to do their jobs better.").
6 See id. at 14 ("In almost every field there are accepted truths, or conventional wis-
dom, that guide decisions and actions. And in almost every field . .. many practitioners
and their advisers are unwilling or unable to observe the world systematically because they
are trapped by their beliefs and ideologies . . . . The result is that much conventional
wisdom is wrong.").
7 See id. at 126 ("[Mlost pay-for-performance programs fail to achieve their
objectives . . . .").
8 See id. at 136 (calling many businesses' focus on strategy a "half-truth[ ]" that "can
obscure as much as it illuminates").
9 See id. at 107 ("A survey of more than 200 human resource professionals . .. found
that even though more than half of the companies used forced ranking, the respondents
reported that forced ranking resulted in lower productivity . . . .").
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cial effects that outweigh their accompanying harms, despite the
thousands of studies business school faculty-who also write these
books-conduct on actual firms. Unfortunately, this is not just a war
among academics as to who can sell the most business books in air-
ports. Managers apparently read and believe these books; Pfeffer and
Sutton document dozens of cases of firms that openly and religiously
embrace these principles.10
Increasingly, however, firms subject their deeply held beliefs to
the rigors of empirical testing. For example, large-scale marketers,
like Wal-Mart, trust no theories and simply manipulate every aspect of
their business and test whether the results produce additional sales."
If putting an open freezer filled with frozen turkey breasts near the
checkout counter produces more sales in July than a stand offering
hot dog rolls, then turkey breasts it is. Never mind the strong intui-
tion that summer is for hot dogs and people only eat turkey in Novem-
ber. Wal-Mart's thousands of stores enable it to collect data on
millions of shopping decisions, thereby allowing them to test every
aspect of conventional wisdom in the pursuit of greater revenue.12
Even economics has embraced the new religion of empiricism.
Economics is a social science, of course, and as such has always had
strong empirical ties. But recent decades have seen the field domi-
nated by game theory and modeling, rather than empirical research.' 3
The field now embraces novel ways of testing a wide range of social
phenomena, however, as evidenced by the popularity of Steven Lev-
itt's publication of Freakonomicsl4 (and its more dubious successor,
Super Freakonomics15). The popularity of these books and Levitt's rise
as a public figure has made finding novel ways to test conventional
wisdom fashionable in economics.
10 See id. at 57-187.
11 According to Professor Ian Ayres, "retailers like Wal-Mart have more information in
their databases than the U.S. Library of Congress." Dana Flavelle, What the Data Crunchers
Know About You, THESTAR.COM (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.thestar.com/business/article/
799986-what-the-data-crunchers-know-about-you; see also IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS:
WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEw WAY TO BE SMART 10-11 (2007) ("Business and
government professionals are relying more and more on databases to guide their
decisions.").
12 See AYRES, supra note 11, at 11 (noting that "Wal-Mart's data warehouse ... stores
more than 570 terabytes" of data).
13 Multiple Nobel Prizes in Economics were awarded to practitioners of game theory
in the past twenty years, including recipients such as John Nash, John Harsanyi, and Rein-
hard Selten in 1994; Thomas Schelling and Robert Aumann in 2005; and Roger Myerson,
Leonid Hurwicz, and Eric Maskin in 2007. See All Prizes in Economic Sciences, NOBEL-
PRIZE.ORG, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/ (last visited Jan. 20,
2011).
14 STEVEN D. LEverr & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST Ex-
PLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (2005).
15 STEVEN D. LEVITr & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, SUPER FREAKONOMICS: GLOBAL COOLING,
PATRIOTIC PROSTITUTES AND WHY SUICIDE BOMBERS SHOULD Buy LIFE INSURANCE (2009).
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The empirical trend has also hit the legal academy. Empirical
legal scholarship has witnessed exponential growth in just the past few
years. Law review articles increasingly either rely heavily on empirical
research or actually present original empirical evidence in support of
their arguments.16 So common are empirical submissions that several
notable law reviews are developing policies for reviewing empirical
pieces. The Yale LawJournal, for example, requires authors to submit
their data to the students who run the journal along with the article
submission.17 The reliance on empirical methods has pushed others
to mimic the peer-review process common to the social sciences.18
Similarly, the University of Chicago Law School's Journal of Legal Stud-
ies now commonly publishes empirical pieces.19
Most importantly, the newly founded Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies (JELS) has experienced enormous success. 20 JELS exclusively
publishes empirical work.21 Even though JELS is only in its eighth
16 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Pam Mueller, Empirical Legal Scholarship in Law
Reviews, 6 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Sci. 581, 592 (2010) (reviewing the content of law reviews
and concluding that although "original empirical work still accounts for only a modest
portion of the work published in law reviews," "[t]he trend, however, continues to be up-
ward"); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules ofInference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2 (2002) ("The
law reviews are replete with articles ranging from the normative to the descriptive, from
narrow doctrinal analyses to large-sample-size (large-n) statistical investigations . . . .
[M]any . . . evince a common characteristic: a concern, however implicit, with empiri-
cism . . . ."); Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law
Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 147 (2006) (reporting that in law reviews, "the number of refer-
ences to ELS phrases-empiric, empirical, quantitative, statistically significant, statistical
significance ... continues to grow").
17 See Anthony Sebok, Law Reviews Submission Guidelines, Fall '06 Version 1.0, http://
www.concurringopinions.com/archives/Fall%2006%2OSubmission%2OGuide%201.0.doc
(last visited Mar. 11, 2011) (noting that for empirical pieces, the Yale Law journal requests
authors to "please upload all materials required for replication (including computer pro-
grams and data sets)").
18 For example, the Harvard Law Review now asserts that it conducts peer review of
articles. See Submissions, HARV. L. REV., http://www.harvardlawreview.org/submissions.php
(last visited Mar. 11, 2011) ("[A] t least two editors review eveiy submission, and many pieces
go through substantially more stages of review, including an Articles Committee vote, a
preemption check, faculty peer review, and a vote by the body of the Review.").
19 See About Journal, J. LEGAL STUD., http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/page/jls/
brief.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2011) ("The journal of Legal Studies is ajournal of interdisci-
plinary academic research into law and legal institutions. It emphasizes social science ap-
proaches, especially those of economics, political science, and psychology, but it also
publishes the work of historians, philosophers, and others who are interested in legal the-
ory."); see also William M. Landes, The Empirical Side of Law & Economics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
167, 170 tbl.1 (2003) (reporting that 38.5% of the articles in the journal of Legal Studies are
empirical). Professor Landes also reports a 2.7% yearly increase in the rate of empirical
articles in the Journal of Law & Economics between 1972 and 2002. Landes, supra, at 172.
20 As a disclaimer, I am one of the editors, as are three others who have contributed
to this Symposium: Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, and Stewart Schwab.
21 See Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, WILEY-BLACKWELL, http://www.wiley.com/bw/
aims.asp?ref=1740-1453&site=1 (last visited Mar. 11, 2011) ("The Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies (fELS) is a peer-edited, peer-refereed, interdisciplinary journal that publishes high-
quality, emirically-oriented articles of interest to scholars in a diverse range of law and law-
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year of existence, studies of the relative impact of law journals show it
to be not only the most cited peer-reviewed law journal in the last
three years, but also near the top ten of all journals generally.22 JELS
also helped inspire the creation of the Society for Empirical Legal
Studies, which now holds an annual conference that, by its second
year, attracted over 300 attendees.23 Combined with an ever-increas-
ing demand for empirically trained legal scholars, these trends suggest
that the reliance on empirical evidence represents a most significant
trend in the legal academy, just as it does in other disciplines.
I
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES: Wiv Now?
Why has empirical legal study grown so quickly at this particular
moment in time? After all, legal issues have always produced empiri-
cal questions. Recognition of the need to use empirical research to
answer legal questions dates back to at least the time of the legal real-
ists. 24 As a lawyer, Louis Brandeis famously compiled social science
research to support his arguments about the need for legislation to
protect women from excessive working hours.25 Even the Supreme
Court's venerable Brown v. Board of Education opinion cites social sci-
ence evidence in support of its holding.26 Studies of important legal
issues within criminology-such as whether the use of the death pen-
alty deters crime-have also been conducted for many decades.27 Is it
correct to conclude that empirical legal research is on the rise? And if
it is on the rise, what has caused this trend?
related fields, including civil justice, corporate law, criminal justice, domestic relations,
economics, finance, health care, political science, psychology, public policy, securities reg-
ulation, and sociology.").
22 See Law Journals: Submissions and Rankings, WASH. & LEE U. Sca. L., http://
lawlib.wlu.edu/j/ (follow "older surveys" hyperlink, then select check box labeled "2009"
and "CF," and click "Submit") (last visited Mar. 11, 2011) (noting that, in 2009, the journal
of Empirical Legal Studies ranked first in "currency factor" among all refereed journals and
fifteenth among all printjournals, with currency factor measuring how rapidlyjournals cite
a particular journal's articles following publication).
23 See Cornell Law School Hosts Record-Breaking 2008 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies,
CORNELL U. L. SCH., http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/spotlight.cfm?pageid=152185 (last
visited Jan. 1, 2011) ("The two-day conference, which featured original empirical and ex-
perimental legal scholarship from a diverse range of fields, attracted more than 300 partici-
pants from all over the world.").
24 See George, supra note 16, at 144 ("Legal realism was the first movement likely to
bring empiricism to law."); Herbert M. Kritzer, Empirical Legal Studies Before 1940: A Biblio-
graphic Essay, 6 J. EMPiUcAL LEGAL STUD. 925 (2009) (cataloging early empirical legal
work).
25 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Muller v. Oregon: One Hundred Years Later, 45 WiLLAM-
ETTE L. REv. 359, 361-65 (2009) (discussing how Louis Brandeis's use of social science
influenced the Court's decision in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)).
26 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
27 For discussion of the debate regarding the death penalty, see infra notes 50-74 and
accompanying text.
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As the use of social science in landmark cases like Muller v. Oregon
and Brown demonstrate, the use of empirical methods in law is not
new. The Law and Society Association was founded nearly fifty years
ago in part to reflect the emergence of the social scientific study of
law.28 Its journal, the Law and Society Review, has published forty-four
volumes worth of social science research in law. 2 9 Similarly, the Amer-
ican Psychology-Law Society's flagship journal, Law and Human Behav-
ior, is in its thirty-fourth volume.30
What is different today is that many law professors simply think
differently about empirical legal scholarship. In 1986, Lawrence
Friedman described law and social science as being akin to a "thick
rug [ ] in the dean's office"; that is, something that is nice to have but
hardly necessary.3' Most top law schools today now seem to view em-
pirical scholars as essential. Harvard, Yale, Chicago, the University of
Pennsylvania (Penn), Stanford, Duke, and most especially Northwest-
ern all have radically increased the number of trained social scientists
on their faculty. All have had economically trained or economically
oriented faculty for many years, of course, but few of these have also
been empiricists.32 Penn, for example, went from having one empiri-
28 The Law and Society Association was founded in 1964. See LAw & Soc'Y Ass'N,
http://www.lawandsociety.org/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
29 See Law & Society Review, LAw & Soc'y Ass'N, http://www.lawandsociety.org/re-
view.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2011) (stating that the Law & Society Review, founded in
1966, has published volumes on an annual basis).
30 See Law and Human Behavior, SPRINGER, http://www.springerlink.com/content/
0147-7307 (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (noting that the first volume of Law and Human
Behavior was published in 1977 and the thirty-fourth volume in 2010).
31 Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 777
(1986) ("Prestigious law schools offer courses in sociology, history, or philosophy of law; or
in psychology or anthropology of law. But everybody knows that these are elegant frills,
like thick rugs in the dean's office; they have nothing to do with 'real' legal education.").
But see Roger C. Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution": The American Law Review, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1, 9 (1986) ("Empirical studies dealing with legal institutions or the legal
profession also find their way increasingly into new specialized faculty-edited journals.").
Ironically, the first use of the term Empirical Legal Studies to mark a particular way of study-
ing law also dates from roughly the same time. See David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is:
Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575, 585 (1984) ("[N]ondoctrinalists,
influenced by a pragmatic concept of law, aware of the fact that legal rules often were only
of marginal impact in daily life, and affected by positivist concepts of knowledge imbibed
through contact with their social science allies, tended to think of themselves as 'empiri-
cists' and to champion empirical legal studies.").
32 For example, Chicago's well-known law and economics orientation has long
boasted Bill Landes, a trained economist, and Judge Richard Posner, both of whom have
consistently produced empirical legal scholarship for many decades. See The Faculty, U.
CHI.: L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/people/faculty (follow hyperlinks "L" and
"P") (last visited Mar. 11, 2011). The first volume of Chicago's Journal of Legal Studies,
published in 1972 and cofounded by Judge Posner, included several notable empirical
contributions. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972)
(presenting a somewhat systematic review of cases in which courts relied on implicit eco-
nomic theories). The University of Michigan Law School has long boasted two well-known
empirical scholars in Phoebe Ellsworth, a psychologist, and Richard Lempert, a sociologist.
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cal scholar to having several in just a couple of years. Yale nearly
doubled its numbers, as did Stanford. And Northwestern went from
considering an association with the American Bar Foundation as ade-
quate to having more than ten empirically trained faculty members
(not even counting their now-outgoing Dean, David Van Zandt, who is
a sociologist)." Empirically trained scholars now seem to be critical
to a fully successful law faculty.3 4
But why is all of this happening now? The need to shed empirical
light on legal questions is not novel, but the ability and desire of legal
scholars to conduct empirical work has changed in several ways.
Three factors have produced this trend: a growth in the number of
entry-level faculty members possessing empirical training,35 the ease
with which empirical research can now be conducted, and the influ-
ence of law and economics.
First, the supply of people trained to conduct empirical work has
grown enormously. Law faculties are increasingly filled with scholars
who possess both a law degree and a PhD in some other discipline.36
The other discipline is not always a social science, of course; PhDs in
history and other humanities are common. But scholars who hold so-
See Professors of Law, MICH. L.: U. MICH. L. SCH., http://web.law.umich.edu/_FacultyBi-
oPage/index.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2011); see also Professors Emeriti, MICH. L.: U. MICH. L.
SCH., http://web.1aw.umich.edu/_FacultyBioPage/index.asp?Category=5 (last visited Mar.
11, 2011).
33 Northwestern University School of Law's web site boasts that the majority of its
faculty have earned PhDs, eighteen of whom hold these degrees in social sciences that are
empirically focused (e.g., political science, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and eco-
nomics). See Faculty Research & Achievement, Nw. L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
faculty/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2011). Not all of these are necessarily empirical scholars
(political science and economics includes subdisciplines that are not primarily empirical),
and the faculty includes scholars who produce empirical work but who do not hold PhDs.
My identification of specific schools is meant only to be illustrative and is necessarily im-
pressionistic. A specific accounting is obviously perilous, as it will inevitably be incomplete,
and those omitted might feel slighted-for which I apologize. The listing in this Essay, for
example, omits the law school faculties of the University of Southern California and New
York University, which successfully hosted the fourth and the second Conference on Em-
pirical Legal Studies, respectively, and which both have sizeable sets of empirical scholars.
My listing also omits two of my own empirically minded coauthors: Mitu Gulati of Duke
University School of Law and Chris Guthrie, the Dean of Vanderbilt University Law School,
which has a large group of scholars devoted to studying human behavior and law.
34 See George, supra note 16, at 152-53 (reporting the percentage of faculty at top
institutions who have social science PhDs); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: Interdisciplinarity,
100 MIcH. L. REV. 1217, 1222 (2002) ("[T]he increasingly empirical study of law is one of
the most dramatic trends in recent legal scholarship.").
35 See George, supra note 16, at 159-60 ("[T]he University of Pennsylvania, the Uni-
versity of Southern California, and Northwestern University have hired remarkable num-
bers of social scientists into entry-level posts.").
36 See id. at 152 tbl.2 (noting that for the 2003-04 academic year, over 20% of the
tenure-track law faculty at the University of California, Berkeley; George Mason University;
Northwestern University; the University of Pennsylvania; and Stanford University had doc-
torates in social science).
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cial science PhDs and law degrees represent a large chunk of the dual
J.D./PhD holders who now teach at law schools.
The attractiveness of J.D./PhDs (in any field) to law faculties is
not hard to understand. Why hire someone with only aJ.D. when you
can have someone from a top school who not only has the J.D. but
also many years of additional training? Furthermore, that additional
training is in how to produce scholarship-something law schools do
not train their J.D. candidates to do.37 Most law schools know that a
decision to hire an entry-level candidate is likely to lead to a decision
to tenure that entry-level faculty member a few years later. Hiring a
J.D. with little or no proven track record of scholarship thus is far
riskier than hiring one who already has published several articles.
Graduate school provides law-faculty candidates the time and training
needed to produce publications, thereby providing law school hiring
committees with an assurance that these candidates can get work out
the door. Such a record also gives hiring committees an indication of
what that scholarship will look like. Job candidates who have not
spent a great deal of time producing scholarship in an academic envi-
ronment are increasingly at a disadvantage on the entry-level teaching
market.
As law schools increasingly hire junior faculty members who pos-
sess empirical training, law will naturally see an increase in empirical
work.38 But those J.D.s trained in the social sciences-more so than
those trained in humanities-are apt to convert at least some of their
colleagues into producers of empirical work.3 9 Social scientists, by na-
ture, collaborate.40 Because collaborative work is a core aspect of
their training, they will look for collaborators among their col-
leagues. 4 1 Social scientists are thus apt to spread their methods
among the faculties that they join.42
Second, empirical legal scholarship has become far easier to con-
duct. In the 1970s, an empirical study of a legal issue would probably
37 Id. at 149-50 ("Law professors with social science doctorates usually are better posi-
tioned to undertake empirical research than are other professors. Law schools generally
do not teach courses in survey methodology, statistical analysis, or research design. Gradu-
ate social science programs do.").
38 See id. at 150 ("[A] law school with a greater proportion of its faculty holding social
science doctorates is more likely to produce [empirical legal scholarship] than a law school
with a lower proportion.").
39 See id. ("Non-social scientists benefit from the presence of social scientists for infor-
mal interactions, such as advice on how to undertake an empirical project or what method
would be appropriate, and for formal collaborations, such as co-authorship.").
40 See Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Joining Forces: The Role of Collaboration in the
Development of Legal Thought, 52J. LEGAL EDUc. 559, 566 fig.4 (2002) (documenting the rate
of coauthorship in various social science disciplines).
41 See George, supra note 16, at 150 ("[A] trend toward increased collaboration can be
seen in law schools.").
42 See id.
908 [Vol. 96:901
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have required hiring a sizeable number of research assistants to gather
data from the original court records-assuming one could obtain the
cooperation of ajudge or other official to gain access to those records.
The data would then have to be coded onto punch cards and run
through the university's mainframe computer system (which might
charge dearly for mainframe computer time). Simply learning how to
use the complex statistical packages that existed in the 1970s was a
full-time job. A would-be legal researcher faced an obstacle of
hazards, from inaccurately punched computer cards and inept re-
search assistants to irritable court clerks and misfiled cases.
The combination of the Internet and the desktop computer has
liberated the modern empirical legal researcher. The Internet has in-
duced courts, government agencies, and others to compile and make
available mountains of data on all manner of subjects related to law.
The Internet also gives the researcher direct access to cases without
leaving the comfort of his or her office. Legal research services such
as Westlaw and LexisNexis make easily available all court decisions
that produce opinions at essentially no cost to legal academics. And
although it does charge, PACER makes every federal court filing avail-
able.4 3 All of this data can be gathered without cumbersome tran-
scription and analyzed with software that runs conveniently on any
laptop computer. Complex statistical analyses still require some care,
of course. But the ability of law faculty to consult the newly hired
social scientists makes even difficult statistical undertakings managea-
ble for any legal academic. 4 4
Third, the contribution of law and economics to empirical legal
study cannot be overlooked. Although the field can be readily at-
tacked for embracing facile assumptions about how legal rules are apt
to work, it creates a framework for developing empirical tests. Law
and economics, more so than other approaches to law, aspires to iden-
tify its assumptions carefully and state the foundations for it conclu-
sions clearly. Both its assumptions and conclusions can thus easily be
tested. Furthermore, economics' concern with effect sizes (that is, the
extent of the influence that any social or legal factor has on behavior)
demands an empirical approach; the magnitude of the influence of
any legal reform on behavior cannot be assessed by intuition. It is
thus perhaps not surprising that many of the contemporary empirical
pieces are presented at the American Law and Economics Association
and published in the Journal of Legal Studies.
43 PACER: PUB. ACCESS TO CT. ELECTRONIc RECs., http://www.pacer.gov/ (last visited
Mar. 11, 2011) ("[PACER] is an electronic public access service that allows users to obtain
case and docket information from federal appellate, district and bankruptcy courts. . . .").
44 See George, supra note 16, at 150 (noting that law faculty can consult their col-
leagues trained in the social sciences for advice on appropriate methods, among other
things).
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Furthermore, law and economics has proven to be amenable to
questioning its own assumptions. The field has embraced behavioral
law and economics as a creditable subdiscipline.4 5 Behavioral law and
economics is, at its core, empirical; its very reason for existence is the
belief that careful empirical work will show that human beings often
do not conform to the assumptions of microeconomic theory.4 6 Law
and economics provided a vast gold mine of basic observations con-
cerning deterrence and incentives. As researchers slowly played this
mine out (and the vein of game theory and law), they embraced more
broad-minded approaches, which included the empirically informed
subdiscipline of behavioral law and economics and work that tested
the basic economic assumptions underlying law and economics
scholarship.47
These three factors are largely responsible for the explosive
growth in empirical work. More social scientists in the legal academy,
using the more readily available sources of data and tools to analyze
them, have joined the surge in interest in empirical work in law and
economics to produce this new wave.
II
EMPIRICAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP Is NOT THE SAME AS
EVIDENCE-BASED LAW
Empirical legal scholarship, however, is not the same as evidence-
based law. Empirical legal scholarship resides primarily in the acad-
emy. The point of evidence-based law is not to produce a set of empir-
ical term papers that we academics can present to each other at
conferences. The point is to create better law-law informed by
reality.
At this point, the jury is still out on whether the empirical legal
studies movement will produce evidence-based law. In fact, the trial is
still in progress. Compared to other disciplines, evidence-based law
lags. Medicine has long relied on empirical research and continues to
45 See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1175 (1997)
("The future of economic analysis of law lies in new and better understandings of decision
and choice.").
46 SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and
Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 739, 766 (2000) ("Economics provided law with a
behavioral theory that is rigorous and precise, but lacks an empirical foundation. Psychol-
ogy offers an empirical, scientific source for theories of human behavior. We have only
begun to see how the scientific study of human behavior will reshape the study of law.").
47 See Sunstein, supra note 45, at 1175 ("[S]ocial scientists have learned a great deal
about how people actually make decisions. Much of this work calls for qualifications of
rational choice models. Those models are often wrong in the simple sense that they yield
inaccurate predictions." (footnote omitted)).
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find new ways to integrate research into the practice.48 Although
many businesses cling to existing theories that lack support,49 the
widespread availability of research tools and statistical analysis has en-
couraged others to test more and more of their ideas before putting
them into practice. Economics, as noted above, is on the move to
empiricism, and is working to sell its new ideas to the general public.
Although empiricism is a big trend within the legal academy, moving
these ideas from the academy into the courts and the legislatures re-
mains a challenge.
Debates on the death penalty and tort reform provide two prime
examples of the failure of empirical work to influence public policy.
The death penalty has remained a part of public debate since 1972,
when the Supreme Court ordered a temporary moratorium on its use
in Furman v. Georgia.50 In Furman, the Court declared all extant death
penalty statutes fundamentally deficient in failing to provide juries
with adequate guidance in when they can impose a death sentence.5 1
States reacted quickly by creating more detailed death penalty stat-
utes, and the Court proclaimed itself satisfied with the new measures
enacted by Georgia four years later in Gregg v. Georgia.52
The temporary moratorium sparked enormous public debate on
the death penalty. Given Furman's focus on the instructions to the
jury, it naturally produced a great deal of legislative activity.53 The
time was ripe for an informed debate, and several social scientists pro-
duced research on the role of death penalty in criminal justice.54 To
be sure, the deterrent effect of the death penalty was not central to
Furman's holding, and neither is evidence that it deters crime essential
to embracing the death penalty as a sentencing option. The death
penalty can be justified on retributive grounds alone, even if the pen-
alty has no instrumental value in deterring crime.55 But embracing
48 See Sackett et al., supra note 3; see also PFEFFER & SurroN, supra note 5, at 13-14
(briefly discussing evidence-based medicine).
49 See PFEFFER & SurroN, supra note 5, at 217 (arguing that many companies "are
more interested in just copying others, doing what they've always done, and making deci-
sions based on beliefs in what ought to work rather than on what actually works").
50 408 U.S. 238, 240, 305, 310, 314, 370-71 (1972) (per curiam).
51 Id. at 370-71.
52 428 U.S. 153, 207, 226-27 (1976).
53 See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTrY AN AMERicAN HISTORY 267 (2002) ("The
Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia . .. touched off the biggest flurry of
capital punishment legislation the nation had ever seen.").
54 See John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the
Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REv. 791, 792-94 (2005) (briefly reviewing some of the
evidence on the death penalty).
55 See Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontol-
ogy, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REv. 751, 752 (2005) (noting that one of the two
principle arguments for the death penalty is retributive: "The first gambit is to consider in
detail the facts of one or more capital murders and to propose that only the punishment of
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retributive goals may seem barbaric to many, and most who support
the death penalty believe it both to be a just punishment in some
cases and an effective deterrent.56 In the mid-1970s, a majority of
Americans both supported the death penalty and believed it to be an
effective deterrent.57 This belief doubtless helped spur numerous
state legislatures to address the concerns the Court raised in Furman
so as to restore its use.
Social science research on the subject, however, provides no clear
answer to the question of whether the death penalty deters crime.
Studies published on the issue in the mid-1970s were divided. Some
suggested that the death penalty deters violent crime, while others-
using much the same data-showed no effect.5 8
Surprisingly, little has changed in over thirty years of study.59 Re-
searchers who took up the issue in recent years produced an analo-
gous result; some studies concluded that the death penalty deters
crime, and others concluded that it does not.60 The contemporary
debate includes some claims that are extremely difficult to support-
such as that each execution deters eighteen homicides, but research-
ers remain divided.61 Curiously, researchers today also often use the
same sources of data to reach completely different conclusions. 62
It might be unfair to hope that social science-so divided on a
subject as the death penalty-could shape public policy. But if empir-
ical legal scholars using the same data and assessing the same subject
cannot reach consensus on an important public policy issue, then
there clearly are problems with converting empirical legal studies into
evidence-based law. Furthermore, the only clear result of the debate
death is an adequate and proportional response to the terrible suffering of the victim in-
tentionally inflicted by the perpetrator-a predominantly retributive argument.").
56 See Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 54, at 792 (asserting that beliefs about deter-
rence affect public debate on the death penalty).
57 See BANNER, supra note 53, at 268 (stating that by 1976, supporters of the death
penalty outnumbered opponents of the death penalty 65% to 28%).
58 See Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 54, at 792 (reviewing research on the deterrent
effect of the death penalty).
59 See id. at 792-94.
60 See id.
61 See Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New
Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 344, 344 (2003).
62 Both Donohue and Wolfers and Dezhbakhsh used the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion's Uniform Crime Reports as primary sources of data to conclude that the death pen-
alty does not and does deter violent crime, respectively. See id. at 360 ("The crime and
arrest rates are from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform Crime Re-
ports."); Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 54, at 796 ("[W]e present two series for homi-
cides-one from the Uniform Crime Reports and the other compiled from Vital Statistics
sources, based on death certificates."). Donohue and Wolfers explicitly attempted to repli-
cate the results of Dezhbakhsh and his colleagues. See Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 54,
at 805 ("Column 2 shows our replication attempt based on independently collected data
(but using the same sources).").
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is that no one should be confident. A reasoned observer should con-
clude that there is no clear evidence that the death penalty deters and
no clear evidence that it does not. Further reflection might allow for
the possibility that even if it does deter crime, the effect is small and is
not easily shown with simple statistical techniques (as a more robust
effect would be expected to). As two of the leading researchers in this
field have argued, the data available provides at best a weak and inevi-
tably inconclusive test of whether the death penalty deters crime.6 3
Whether the death penalty deters crime or it does not, it is clear
that social science research on the death penalty has no effect whatso-
ever on the public or on legislatures.64 In the 2000 presidential cam-
paign, then-candidate George W. Bush (who signed over 150 death
warrants as Governor of Texas65 ) asserted that the death penalty
could not be supported unless it functions effectively as a deterrent.66
Despite the conflicting evidence, the eventual President stated the po-
sition of many Americans by asserting his belief that it does.67 The
belief that the death penalty deters crime plays a notable role in pub-
lic support for the death penalty.68 And public support for the death
penalty has remained largely constant since the mid-1970s, at least un-
til very recently.69 Its recent decline in use is also likely unrelated to
the current social science debate, but rather stems from several high-
63 See Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 54, at 794 ("[T]he death penalty-at least as it
has been implemented in the United States since Gregg ended the moratorium on execu-
tions-is applied so rarely that the number of homicides it can plausibly have caused or
deterred cannot be reliably disentangled from the large year-to-year changes in the homi-
cide rate caused by other factors.").
64 See BANNER, supra note 53, at 281 ("Academic studies of deterrence had scarcely any
impact, in any event, on the pervasive folk wisdom that the death penalty had to have a
deterrent effect, simply because it was more severe than any other.").
65 See Alan Berlow, The Texas Clemency Memos, ATLANTic MONTHLY, Jul./Aug. 2003, at
91, 91 ("During Bush's six years as governor 150 men and two women were executed in
Texas-a record unmatched by any other governor in modem American history.").
66 The Third Gore-Bush Presidential Debate: October 17, 2000 Debate Transcript, COMMIssioN
ON PRESIDENTrAL. DEBATES, http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-17-2000-de-
bate-transcript (last visited Mar. 11, 2011) (noting that when asked if he believed the death
penalty deterred crime, Bush responded: "I do. It's the only reason to be for it. Let me
finish, sir. I don't think you should support the death penalty to seek revenge. I don't
think that's right. I think the reason to support the death penalty is because it saves other
people's lives.").
67 Id.
68 SeeJeffrey M. Jones, Support for the Death Penalty 30 Years Ajier the Supreme Court Rul-
ing, GALLUP (June 30, 2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/23548/Support-Death-Penalty-
Years-After-Supreme-Court-Ruling.aspx (reporting that, in 2003, 11% of those who sup-
ported the death penalty cited deterrence as the primary reason for their support).
69 BANNER, supra note 53, at 275 (noting that "[c]apital punishment's popularity held
steady" from the 1970s to the 1990s).
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profile cases of convicted defendants who were later exonerated
through the use of DNA testing.70
Even the application of the death penalty is largely unaffected by
social science. Findings that jurors are confused by death penalty in-
structions,7' are overly influenced by victim impact statements,72 and
are more prone to impose the death penalty due to certain screening
procedures73 have not changed how the courts implement the death
penalty. Neither has evidence that the death penalty is administered
in a way that produces large racial disparities had any real influence
on its administration. 7 4 Execution rates continue apace, with only
modest reforms.
Second, consider the tort reform movement. Since at least the
1980s, if not before, the general public has embraced the myth that
the civil litigation system is out of control.75 Popular books like The
Litigation Explosion express the concern that civil juries are ruining
American business with arbitrary judgments of enormous size.76 The
supposed litigation juggernaut forces reasonable businesses to shut
70 See Robert Ruby, Capital Punishment's Consistent Constituency: An American Majority,
PEW RES. CENTER (June 26, 2007), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/523/capital-punish-
ments-constant-constituency-an-american-majority (noting the rising number of exonera-
tions and stating that "[mleanwhile, support for the death penalty among the public has
declined somewhat from its peak in the mid 1990s"). But see id. (noting that support for
the death penalty "still remains at a substantial 64%").
71 See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in
Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9 (1993) ("In addition to jurors' imposed ignorance of
the sentencing alternative, their lack of understanding of the standards of proof applicable
to mitigating circumstances and the required level of interjuror agreement also hamper
the decisionmaking process.").
72 See Bryan Myers & Edith Greene, The Prejudicial Nature of Victim Impact Statements:
Implications for Capital Sentencing Policy, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 492, 506-07 (2004)
(noting that "[t]here is mounting empirical evidence that the status and character of the
victim have a significant effect on jurors' decisions about life and death" and recom-
mending that such victim impact evidence be limited or eliminated). But see Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics and Victim Impact Evidence in South Carolina Capital
Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 340 (2003) ("VIE [victim impact evidence] has a modest
effect, if any, on sentencing outcomes.").
73 See William C. Thompson, Death Qualification After Wainwright v. Witt and Lockhart
v. McCree, 13 LAw & Hum. BEHAv. 185, 185 (1989) ("Critics of death qualification have
argued for many years that death qualified jurors (those who survive death qualification)
are more conviction-prone than those who are excluded . . . .").
74 See DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PutAsKI, JR., EQUAL Jus-
TICE AND THE DEATH PENALTv: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIs 399-404 (1990) (describing
evidence of race-of-victim discrimination but noting that there was weaker evidence of
race-of-defendant discrimination post-Furman).
75 Stephen S. Meinhold & David W. Neubauer, Exploring Attitudes About the Litigation
Explosion, 22JusT. Sys.J. 105, 106 (2001) (stating that "[it is now conventional wisdom that
the United States suffers from a litigation explosion" but that social scientists have de-
bunked this myth); see Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3,
3-5 (1986) (documenting observations of an increasingly litigious society).
76 See WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 152-77 (1991) (discussing wildly disparate jury verdicts).
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down and raises everyone's insurance rates or makes insurance un-
available.77 Stories abound of undeserving plaintiffs recovering hun-
dred of thousands of dollars. Newspapers tell of "ghost riders" who
board city buses after accidents so they can claim injuries and extract
large settlements from municipalities.7 8 To many, greedy lawyers con
foolish juries into rendering decisions that hang like a dead weight
around the economy's neck.
Concerns about medical malpractice have been among the most
prominent in the debate about tort reform. Doctors have complained
endlessly, vocally, and effectively about frivolous medical malpractice
claims.79 Concerns about rising insurance premiums or the complete
unavailability of policies have led many legislatures to limit medical
malpractice claims through difficult pleading requirements8 o or dam-
age caps.81 Even with these reforms, the belief that medical malprac-
tice suits lead doctors to conduct unnecessary tests and otherwise
practice "defensive medicine" is pervasive.82 In addition to ruining
businesses and raising taxes, the civil litigation system is also believed
to be part of the reason why health care is so expensive in the United
States.83
The central parable motivating these beliefs arose, oddly enough,
from an injury at a McDonald's. The anecdote tells of an elderly
woman who ordered coffee from a McDonald's drive-through window
and accidently spilled it on herself, causing serious burns.84 She sued,
77 See id. at 184 (noting that in the context of automobile insurance, for example,
people pay higher rates when there is more lawsuit exposure).
78 See Peter Kerr, 'Ghost Riders' Are Target of an Insurance Sting, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 18,
1993, at Al.
79 See Tom BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 43, 45 (2005) (stating that the
standard refrain of the American Medical Association is that "[t]he tort system is out of
control" and arguing that "when it comes to medical malpractice, the organized interests
who want to downplay the impact of malpractice and exaggerate the impact of lawsuits
have outhustled, outspent, and just plain beat the other team in mobilizing public
opinion").
80 Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain Solution to the Medical
Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct About Special Pleading and
the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REv. 971, 983-84 (2005) (noting that many states have enacted
legislation that "heighten [s] the standard of pleading required to bring a medical malprac-
tice action").
81 Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps,
80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 391, 412 (2005) (stating that, in 2005, twenty-nine states had compensa-
tory damage caps).
82 See BAKER, supra note 79, at 118-39 (discussing defensive medicine).
83 See id. at 5-6 ("[Plublic opinion remains firmly anchored to the view
that . .. medical malpractice lawsuits contribute significantly to the high cost of health care
in the United States."). But see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILIv FOR MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE 1 (2004) ("[M]alpractice costs account for less than 2 percent of [health
care] spending.").
84 Liebeck v. McDonald's, No. CV-9'M2419, 1994 WL 16777703 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Jul.
29, 1994) (trial order).
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and a jury awarded her $2.7 million in punitive damages against Mc-
Donald's. 85 If Americans can name any civil case in the United States,
it is this one. And the case is well known the world over; it is the
poster child for an allegedly out-of-control legal system that is choking
the society in which it exists.
The reality could not be more different. The statistics undermin-
ing this story are overwhelming. Virtually every aspect of the litigation
explosion has proven to be false.86 Studies of case filings over previ-
ous decades indicate slow and steady growth consistent with increases
in the size of the economy and population generally.87 Studies of
amounts paid out are similar.88 Insurance premiums are more erratic,
but their fluctuations do not track litigation trends.8 9 Attorney's fees
in large (i.e., class action) cases have remained constant for many
years.90 Jury awards, far from being erratic, seem predictable and sta-
ble. 91 They seem little different from judges' awards, in fact.9 2 Even
the supposed 'judicial hellholes," where corporate defendants suppos-
edly pay endlessly to any plaintiff lucky enough to bring suit, do not
exist; jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction variances in damages awards attribu-
table to demographic factors are minimal.93
Tort reform thus pits social science against anecdote.94 Thus far,
anecdote has won handily. Damage caps are rampant, with one legis-
85 Liebeck v. McDonald's Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, at *1
(N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994).
86 See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1149 (1992) ("Much of what we think we
know about the behavior of the tort litigation system is untrue, unknown, or
unknowable.").
87 See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093,
1103-05 (1996).
88 See id. at 1113-15 (suggesting that while the volume of awards has been increasing,
this could be because "the composition of the pool of tried cases has changed" and "the
cost of compensating victims has changed").
89 See BAKER supra note 79, at 45 (stating that in the medical malpractice context, it is
"[n]ot crazy, but not right" to "think that malpractice lawsuits are the reason for the insur-
ance premium hikes").
90 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements:
An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 28 (2004) ("Contrary to popular belief,
we find no robust evidence that either recoveries for plaintiffs or fees of their attorneys as a
percentage of the class recovery increased during the time period studied.").
91 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REv. 119, 147-48 fig.5 (2002) (arguing that trial awards are not out of control and noting
that the ratio of the mean personal injury tort award to the mean general contract award
has actually been decreasing).
92 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses
Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 263, 265 (2006).
93 See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and Demographics: Is There
a Bronx Effect?, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1839 (2002).
9 See Saks, supra note 86, at 1161 ("Anecdotes have a power to mislead us into think-
ing we know things that anecdotes simply cannot teach us.").
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lature after another adopting them.9 5 Reforms have brought height-
ened pleading to prisoners' rights litigation,'9 6 securities litigation,'9 7
and most recently, to all cases filed in federal court.98 In response to
the existence of the supposed judicial hellholes, the Federal Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act also limits the ability of plaintiffs to sue in their pre-
ferred forum.99 To be sure, the advocates of tort reform have not
gotten their way in every respect. The jury remains in widespread use.
And even though it would likely have smoothed the path to health
insurance reform, doctors have not seen the implementation of any
kind of no-fault liability system that they have long sought. But the
reforms have mounted even while the social science evidence strongly
suggests that they serve a nonexistent problem.100
In short, although the rise of the empirical legal studies move-
ment within law promises to bring more well-informed legal policy to
the academy, so far, it is well short of creating an evidence-based legal
system.
III
THE OBSTACLES To EVIDENCE-BASED LAw
Why have the evidence-based movements made so much headway
in medicine and in business, but not in law? Two principle reasons
seem important: first, law has conflicting goals, unlike medicine and
business; and second, people do not reason about social phenomena
the way they reason about medicine and business. The first is a prob-
lem, to be sure, but it is the second that is the most significant impedi-
ment to evidence-based law.
A. The Nature of Law Itself Impedes Evidence-Based Law
Medicine and business have clear goals. In medicine, the goal is
a positive outcome for the patient's health. Bad treatments can per-
95 See David A. Hyman et al., Estimating the Effect of Damage Caps in Medical Malpractice
Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIs 355, 356 (2009) (noting that thirty states have
damage caps).
96 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to
1321-77.
97 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
98 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 826-31 (2010) (reviewing recent changes to pleading practice).
99 Class Action Fairness Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
CAFAjudicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1553, 1554-55 (2008) (noting
that CAFA's intent was to "defeat[ ] the plaintiffs' bar's manipulation of state courts" by
"funnel[ing] more class actions away from the state courts and into the federal courts, and
perhaps thereby to discourage class actions").
100 See supra notes 75-93 and accompanying text.
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sist for long periods of time, but doctors agree that treatments proved
to be ineffective should be abandoned. Evidence-based medicine
serves that goal, and hence it is easy to see why it finds acceptance.
Medicine embraces the scientific method as a basis for consensus, and
if that method shows that a particular treatment saves more lives, doc-
tors will embrace it. Self-interest and other obstacles can impede the
process, but both the goal and the methods are clear.
Business likewise has a clear yardstick by which success can be
measured-perhaps even a clearer one than medicine. A business is
judged by its bottom line. Investors in Wal-Mart do not care if Wal-
Mart has a clever theory, they care if Wal-Mart makes money for them.
And if selling turkeys in July makes money, then so be it. Just as in
medicine, inefficient business practices can persist.101 But over time,
methods that produce more money ultimately will keep a business
going.
Law, however, lacks such a unifying, organizing principle. Efforts
to define its purpose lead only to greater complexity. Almost every
area of law is filled with conflicting purpose. Tort and contract law
both embrace efforts to achieve efficiency, but also fairness. Criminal
law balances rights of the accused with society's broader need to con-
trol crime. Conflicting themes run through every area of law.
Consequently, empirical study alone cannot dictate legal policy.
Even if most people agreed that the death penalty deters crime, the
result of this research would not conclusively demonstrate that the
death penalty should be retained. The death penalty could still be
considered immoral or unjust.102 Similarly, even if social science evi-
dence revealed that malpractice damage awards were stable and rea-
sonable, a legislature could support a damage cap as a means of
quantifying societal views of what constitutes the outermost value of
malpractice. Multiple and sometimes conflicting justifications under-
lie most legal rules.
Empirical legal studies can rule out certain theories, however.
Empiricism is particularly adept at subjecting the reasons people offer
for their support for or opposition to a particular rule or system to
serious testing. If people say that the death penalty must deter crime
or else it is not acceptable, then deterrence can be tested.10 3 If the
business community asserts that the jurors are effectively "spinning a
roulette wheel" to ascertain a punitive damage award, then that claim
101 See PFEFFER & SUTrON, supra note 5, at 13-14 (arguing that in almost any field,
inefficient practices persist).
102 See Steiker, supra note 55, at 755.
103 See BANNER, supra note 53, at 280-81 (describing studies on the deterrent effect of
the death penalty and stating that "[a] few studies found a deterrent effect, but most did
not").
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can be assessed.1 04 Empirical studies cannot always answer the ulti-
mate question, but they can rule out certain arguments. The problem
of multiple purposes is thus an impediment to evidence-based law, but
not an insurmountable one.
B. Human Inference as an Impediment to Evidence-Based Law
The power of anecdote stands as a significant impediment to the
development of evidence-based law. Anecdotes about ghost riders or
people who obtain a multimillion-dollar judgment for spilled coffee
are hard to ignore. So too are stories about criminals who are re-
leased from prison only to commit horrible crimes powerful contribu-
tors to the popularity of the death penalty. Statistics are invariably
more pallid than anecdotes. No single anecdote can capture the idea
that the civil justice system is stable, or that the murder rate would be
the same without the death penalty.
But the power of anecdote alone cannot entirely explain why
public opinion on the legal system diverges so markedly from reality.
Anecdotes come from somewhere, and not all anecdotes take hold.
The anecdotes that support tort reform, in particular, seem to be pro-
moted actively by the business community and the insurance indus-
try.1 05 For example, the insurance industry benefits enormously from
the belief in the runawayjury.10 6 To insurance firms, the introduction
of a damage cap represents a surprising exogenous shock that reduces
their payouts. Because insurers price premiums based on a prediction
as to the likely payouts, any such shock will temporarily bring them
extra profits. Furthermore, damage caps make their awards more pre-
dictable. The business community also benefits from reductions in
damage awards. These groups will do their utmost to encourage the
media to report on stories of out-of-control juries, ensuring that these
kinds of anecdotes proliferate widely.
Some politicians likewise benefit from highly publicized stories
involving violent criminals. In the United States, the Republican Party
has been seen as the champion of law and order for the past few de-
cades. This ensures that virtually every election will feature a candi-
date who will want to appear to be "tough on crime." A hard
approach to crime control, however, is only useful if the polity per-
104 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., juries, judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical
Study, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 743, 750-79 (2002) (subjecting claims regarding damage awards
to empirical analysis).
105 See Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair,
and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPiRUCAL LEGAL STUD. 969, 1002 (2009) (arguing that "[t]he
Chamber [of Commerce] needs devils to justify its tort reform budget" and to promote
legislation).
106 See Robert L. Habush, The Insurance "Crisis": Reality or Myth? A Plaintiffs' Lawyer's
Perspective, 64 DENv. U. L. REV. 641 (1988).
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ceives crime as an important social issue. Making sure the public has
access to anecdotal accounts of violent crime thus serves the interest
of one of the major political parties. Every voter old enough to re-
member the 1988 U.S. presidential campaign will recall that candi-
date Michael Dukakis was hurt badly by the fact that when he was
Governor of Massachusetts, his administration released a criminal
named Willie Horton, who went on to rape and kill a resident of Mary-
land.'07 This anecdote likely eliminated parole for thousands of of-
fenders nationwide, as politicians shuddered to think the same might
happen to them if they too released the wrong inmate.
But even this is an incomplete account of the influence of anec-
dotes. Anecdotes likely also affect medicine and business in much the
same way. Anecdotes are always potent as easily understandable and
commonly available mechanisms for inspiring belief. Medicine and
business also certainly have their own entrenched interests that bene-
fit from certain commonly held beliefs. For example, drug companies
benefit when doctors believe their products work and are safe, while
CEOs have benefitted amazingly from the belief among corporate
boards that the firm benefits when the CEO has a powerful incentive
to keep stock prices high. But the law is especially vulnerable to the
power of anecdotes-why?
The answer lies in an assessment of which anecdotes stick and
which ones influence the public. Anecdotes are not all created equal.
There are anecdotes of individuals who have been given dramatically
long and apparently unjust sentences under California's three-strikes
law 08 or under the federal sentencing guidelines for convictions for
low-level drug sales and drug possession.109 But these are harder to
come by. At the same time, everyone remembers Willie Horton. Like-
wise, stories that would support a robust tort system also exist-such as
those involving medical doctors engaged in outrageous conduct or
drug companies lying about the adverse consequences of their drugs.
But these anecdotes do not seem to have as much bite as a cup of hot
coffee at McDonald's.
It is also important that the anecdotes supporting civil justice re-
form or the death penalty are not even always accurate. The plaintiff
107 See Carol S. Steiker &Jordan M. Steiker, Abolition in Our Time, I OHIO ST.J. Cium. L.
323, 342 (2003) ("Willie Horton's face [was] so powerfully used in the late 1980s as the
symbol of what was wrong with American crime policy. . . .").
108 See Emily Bazelon, Arguing Three Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2010, § 6 (Magazine), at
40 (describing the case of Norman Williams, who was sentenced to life in prison under
California's repeat-offender law for stealing a floor jack from a tow truck).
109 See Adam Liptak, Long Term in Drug Case Fuels Debate on Sentencing Mandatory Mini-
mums Called Too Tough, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2004, at N20 (describing the case of a man
facing over fifty years in prison for selling several hundred dollars worth of marijuana).
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in the McDonald's coffee case was severely burned on her genitalia.1 10
Her lawyer also produced convincing evidence that: McDonald's had
received a long list of complaints about their coffee, McDonald's knew
its coffee was too hot, and it refused to change the temperature
(partly because the company believed the coffee tasted better when
hot).' The plaintiff also only received a modest settlement, not mil-
lions of dollars. Furthermore, although Willie Horton's story was
true, he was one of many thousands of prisoners released on a pro-
gram that might have reduced recidivism rates (and hence violent
crime) overall. The anecdotes that stick and that have force are not
random stories. They are the anecdotes that speak to closely held po-
litical, cultural, or social beliefs. They are available to people because
they resonate with more deeply held beliefs.
In effect, the anecdotes are the symptom, not the disease. People
who already shun lawyers, embrace a stylized kind of individualism
where people take care of themselves, and who do not seek compensa-
tion through some collective mechanism believe that the tort system is
an unnecessary lodestone, whether it is out of control or not. People
who hold law and order to be a central purpose of government believe
in the death penalty even without the specter of Willie Horton to en-
courage their beliefs. This is largely why beliefs that the criminal jus-
tice system is too favorable to criminals, that the death penalty is
critical to crime control, and that the tort system is out of control do
not fluctuate much with the existence or absence of a recent vivid
anecdote.
American society is fertile ground for these anecdotes and for the
beliefs that animate these anecdotes. Many people in our society em-
brace a hierarchical worldview that supports a stern criminal justice
system." 2 We also have many deeply individualistic people who be-
lieve that everyone should take care of themselves and thus should
blame themselves rather than corporations when they are injured.113
These beliefs are important to people and are resilient. The anec-
dotes provide a kind of defense mechanism, making it easy for people
to explain the veracity of their beliefs to themselves and to others.
The deeply held nature of these beliefs also shows why they clus-
ter together so tightly.114 For example, despite former President
110 See Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is Worth
$2.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at Al.
111 Id.
112 See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REv. 115, 122-23 (2007)
(noting that some "support a relatively hierarchical social order" and are more likely to
worry about "forms of behavior that denigrate traditional, stratifying norms" (emphasis
omitted)).
113 See id. at 122.
114 See id. at 122-25.
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Bush's remarks, the belief that the death penalty deters crime is not
essential to believing that it should be a part of a criminal justice sys-
tem; retributive goals would suffice. And yet, people who support the
death penalty nearly uniformly believe that it deters crime. They also
tend to believe that gun ownership makes society safer, that abortion
should be illegal, that legalization of gay marriage would increase di-
vorce rates, and that climate change is not a serious problem. 15 Many
are also creationists. These beliefs are significantly correlated because
they reflect more fundamental beliefs about how society should run
and what it should value. Social science evidence (or even biological
and geological evidence in the case of evolution) is beside the point.
The fundamental difficulty that the persistence of these anec-
dotes raises is thus not the power of anecdotes, but the fundamental
nature of how people think about their society. How people see them-
selves and what they value as important indicates how they react to
social science evidence. Dan Kahan and his coauthors have published
study after study showing that people's cultural commitments affect
how they react to social science.116 People reject evidence that is in-
consistent with their views about society and their role in it."' 7 They
embrace evidence that affirms their views.
Medicine and business have similar problems of course, but cul-
tural commitments have a much more superficial influence on these
fields. Medicine has a shared ethic and faith in science that is, in part,
what draws people to it. Training deepens this ethic. Business draws
more broadly from society and has less rigorous training, but also at-
tracts and promotes the success of people who attend to the bottom
line. Law is really about governing society. It is a form of politics.
Evidence-based law thus faces a far steeper climb than does evidence-
based medicine or business.
IV
CONCLUSION: WHAr HOPE Is THERE FOR
EVIDENCE-BASED LAw?
This Essay is meant to praise the empirical legal studies move-
ment and evidence-based law-not to criticize it. But it is hard to be
optimistic about the prospect for empirically informed legal policy.
Law is a hard area in which to conduct empirical research-harder
than medicine or business. The lack of shared goals means that many
studies are essentially irrelevant to underlying legal policy. Worse yet,
the overwhelming tendency among the polity is to treat all social sci-
ence as essentially meaningless. People interpret social science evi-
15 See id. at 122-42.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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dence in ways that are consistent with their beliefs, embracing work
that supports them and rejecting work that does not.
This landscape would seem to relegate empirical legal studies to a
set of term papers that attendees at the annual empirical legal studies
conference happily present to one another-and to no one else. This
image is overly bleak, of course. We are not merely in the business of
writing term papers to each other (at least, not any more than any
other area of legal scholarship). The findings from empirical legal
studies get picked up from time to time in the popular press and may
change the nature of arguments relating to ongoing issues. And even
though politics seems often dominated by extremists, a vast middle of
the polity may be open to listening to the consensus of the research.
Furthermore, law is not always crafted in the open glare of politi-
cal influences. Administrative agencies and congressional staffers are
heavy consumers of science and social science. So too are many
judges. Entities that need not be subject directly to the electoral cru-
cible and who embrace the professional aim of "getting the science
right" can be open to the work of empirical legal studies. For exam-
ple, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee itself not only commis-
sioned an empirical legal study to assess the impact of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions on pleading, but also seems completely open
to accepting the study's results. 18 Similarly, the United States Sen-
tencing Commission undertook a similar inquiry to assess the impact
of the Court's recent decisions on sentencing.119 And the Office of
Information and Regulatory Assessment is now headed by an empiri-
cal legal scholar, Cass Sunstein, who currently is drafting instructions
to all federal agencies to attend to the real-world effects of their regu-
latory undertakings. 120
In sum, even as the empirical legal studies movement expands,
evidence-based law faces real obstacles. Empirical study of important
social phenomena do not always provide clear answers, given the con-
flicting purposes of many legal rules and that the messages of empiri-
cal study will often conflict with deeply held political beliefs,
undermining their influence. But as policymakers continue to be ex-
posed to empirical ways of thinking about legal questions, at least in
some quarters, evidence-based law might begin to emerge as a real
social phenomenon.
118 Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosen-
thal, to the Civil Rules Comm. and the Standing Rules Comm. (July 26, 2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal_memo_072610.pdf.
119 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF United States v. Booker on
Federal Sentencing (2006).
120 Office of Management and Budget: About OIRA, WHITEHOUSE.Gov, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg-administrator/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
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